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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LAKE PLACID POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
-and-
LAKE PLACID VILLAGE, INC.,
-and-
Employer,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6232
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Lake Placid Police Benevolent Association
V
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of
Certification - C-6232 -2
grievances.
Included: All Police Officers.
Excluded: Chief, Assistant Chief and all other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Lake Placid Police Benevolent Association. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party.to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: May 27, 2014
Albany, New York
Jerome Lefly^witz/Chairperson
'c l _____
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LOCAL 342, UMD, I LA, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6233
UNIONDALE FIRE DISTRICT,
Employer.
WILLIAM C. DeWITT, ESQ., for Petitioner
WILLIAM M. HENNESSEY, for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On December 6, 2013, Local 342, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Uniondale Fire District (employer).
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate:
Included: Automotive Mechanic, Cleaner, Fire Apparatus Mechanic,
Firehouse Maintainer, Fire Prevention Officer and Senior 
Firehouse Maintainer.
i
Excluded: All elected Commissioners, District Secretary and all other
employees.
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 17, 2014, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner.
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is 
dismissed.
DATED: May 27, 2014 o
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
SIMPSON GRAY,
-and-
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-31531
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
AFL-CIO,
Respondent,
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Employer.
SIMPSON GRAY, pro se
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (ERIC W. CHEN of 
counsel), for Respondent
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KELLIE TERESE WALKER of counsel), for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Simpson Gray to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that dismissed his improper practice charge against the
United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (“UFT”)
\ ,
in which Gray alleged that UFT violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair
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Employment Act (“Act”).1 The ALJ held that Gray refused to prosecute his charge at a long- 
scheduled hearing on October 8, 2013.
EXCEPTIONS
Gray argues that he did not refuse to prosecute his charge. Rather, according to 
Gray, the ALJ unfairly refused to grant his request to cancel the hearing so that he could 
review the nearly 50 Administrative Law Judge exhibits that the ALJ introduced into the 
record at the outset of the hearing. In effect, he argues that the ALJ prejudiced his ability to 
prosecute his case to such an extent that he could not proceed on the scheduled day of the 
hearing. In that regard, he alleges that the ALJ was biased against him, noting that she had 
previously dismissed an improper practice charge that he had filed against UFT, also 
because he refused to present his evidence.
UFT and the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(“District”), a statutory party pursuant to § 205.5 (d) and 209-a.3 of the Act filed responses to 
the exceptions supporting the ALJ’s determination.
FACTS
The relevant facts with record references, largely consisting of the processing history 
of Gray’s improper practice charge, are accurately set forth in the ALJ’s decision. Briefly, on 
December 2, 2011, Gray filed an improper practice charge alleging, as amended, that the 
UFT violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Act when it refused to assist him in appealing an 
unsatisfactory performance rating that the District gave to him. UFT and the District filed *
1 46 PERB U 4602 (2013).
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answers and amended answers, each denying any violation of the Act and raising timeliness 
defenses.
At all relevant times, PERB’s procedure was to assign improper practice charges to a 
conferencing ALJ, and then, if a hearing were necessary, to a different ALJ to conduct the 
hearing and write a decision. Accordingly, Gray’s improper practice charge was assigned to 
a conferencing ALJ (Angela Blassman). After the matter was conferenced, it was assigned 
to a hearing ALJ (Philip Maier), who, by letter dated April 12, 2012, scheduled the matter for 
a hearing on June 13, 2012. By letter dated May 9, 2012, ALJ Maier adjourned the hearing 
in order to afford Gray time to file an amended charge. By letter dated May 24, Maier 
granted Gray an extension until June 8 to file his amendment. By letter dated August 27, 
Maier advised the parties that he had accepted employment elsewhere and that the matter 
would be reassigned to another ALJ to conduct the hearing. Thereafter, by letter dated 
January 10, 2013, the parties were advised that the matter had been reassigned to ALJ 
Elena Cacavas, the only remaining ALJ in PERB’s Brooklyn office who could conduct the 
hearing under PERB’s bifurcated procedure. The letter further advised that a hearing was 
scheduled for July 17, 2013.
LIFT requested that the hearing be adjourned to another date due to the unavailability 
of certain witnesses. In requesting the adjournment, UFT’s attorney explained that he had 
attempted to obtain Gray’s consent, but that Gray had not responded to him. Gray then 
responded to UFT’s letter on April 22, 2013, arguing that the case was taking “far too long for 
a proper and timely adjudication.” ALJ Cacavas granted UFT’s request by letter dated May 
16, 2013, noting that Gray had not responded to UFT’s request for his consent to the 
adjournment and that the grounds for UFT’s request, the unavailability of witnesses,
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constituted good cause. Although initially rescheduled for one day of hearing -  October 9, 
2013 -  the ALJ later added an additional day -  October 8 -  to accommodate Gray’s interest 
in completing the hearing quickly in the event a second hearing day was required.
The hearing opened on October 8, 2013, with the ALJ introducing 48 “ALJ Exhibits” 
consisting of the pleadings and letters and notices. All had been previously sent to the 
parties by PERB or submitted to PERB by the parties and copied to each other. Indeed, all 
but a very few of the documents consisted of letters regarding the processing of the case, 
such as requests for adjournments, responses and notices from the assigned ALJs. The 
balance of the documents consisted of the charge, its amendment, and the answers thereto. 
Each exhibit was accurately described for the parties by the ALJ on the record, and the ALJ 
advised the parties that they could introduce additional documents if they found it necessary.
Gray requested that the hearing be cancelled and rescheduled for another date so 
that he could review the ALJ exhibits. Noting the prolonged period it had taken to schedule 
the hearing for October 8 and 9, the ALJ observed that the documents had been in Gray’s 
possession for many months and that he had had an ample opportunity to review them and 
prepare for the hearing.2 Indeed, the latest of the ALJ exhibits was dated May 16, 2013, 
from ALJ Cacavas scheduling the hearing for October 8 and 9, 2013. Therefore, the ALJ 
called upon Gray to take the stand and present his proof. He replied, again, that he was 
unprepared to do so as he had not reviewed the ALJ exhibits. Again, he asked for an 
adjournment, which the ALJ again denied.
Gray refused to take the stand and present his proof in support of his charge. 
Therefore, the ALJ dismissed his charge.
2 Transcript, p. 14.
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DISCUSSION
We find no reason to conclude that Gray was prejudiced r- much less denied due 
process -  by the ALJ’s insistence that he present his proof in support of his charge at the 
October 8 hearing; a hearing that had been scheduled for nearly five months. There is no 
indication that Gray had not submitted or received any of the ALJ exhibits, which the ALJ 
accurately described on the record before accepting them into evidence.
Moreover, contrary to Gray’s argument, an ALJ’s bias toward a party is not 
established by the mere fact that the ALJ had previously ruled or decided against that party 
in any given proceeding or in any previous matter. Indeed, we find not the slightest 
suggestion that the ALJ was biased against Gray in denying his request to cancel the 
October 8 hearing or in dismissing his charge for want of prosecution. Accordingly, there is 
no reason why she was disqualified or should have recused herself from the hearing.
Finally, Gray was well aware of the potential consequences for not putting in his proof
in support of his charge. In United Fedn of Tchrs and District (Gray),3 a substantially similar
result ensued after Gray failed to adduce any proof in support of his charge. Accordingly, we
endorse the ALJ’s reliance on United Fedn of Teachers (Armatas), where we held:4
A charging party who takes it upon himself or herself 
to refuse to participate in a PERB proceeding because 
of an adverse ruling does so at his or her peril 
because such a refusal constitutes a failure to 
prosecute the charge and may result in the dismissal
3 42 PERB Tf 3011 (2009), petition for review dismissed sub nom. Gray v PERB, 43 PERB 
U 7004 (Sup Ct New York County 2-0010).
4 31 PERB U3042, at 3092 (1998).
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of the charge.
Therefore, we deny Gray’s exceptions and affirm the ALJ’s decision dismissing his 
improper practice charge in its entirety.
DATED: May 27, 2014
Albany, New York
/ -------------------------- :-----------r - —
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
BLOOMING GROVE POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-28579
- and -
TOWN OF BLOOMING GROVE,
Respondent.
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party
JACOBOWITZ & GAILEY, LLP (J. BENJAMIN GAILEY of counsel), 
for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Blooming Grove 
(“Town”) to the determination of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (“Act”) by unilaterally 
terminating a past practice of allowing employees represented by the Blooming Grove 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (“PBA”) the right to swap shifts and tours with one 
another.1
1 . ' EXCEPTIONS
The Town alleges that the PBA failed to establish that shift and tour swapping 
among unit employees amounted to a “past practice” that is cognizable under the Act. 
Specifically, it alleges that such swaps were infrequent and unknown to the Town. 1
1 46 PERBH4576 (2013).
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Alternatively, the Town alleges that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement reflects 
its satisfaction of its duty to negotiate concerning the termination of the practice or that 
the PBA waived its bargaining rights concerning the subject.
The PBA filed a response in support of the ALJ’s determination.
Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ, and we adopt her recommended order.
FACTS :
The relevant facts are accurately recounted by the ALJ.
The Town operates a small police department consisting of 11 police officers, 
one detective, four sergeants and a chief of police. The 11 police officers and the 
detective are in a collective bargaining unit represented by the PBA. The sergeants are 
in a separate bargaining unit.
r
The PBA and the Town were, at the time of the at-issue conduct, parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that expired on December 31,2008. That 
agreement was renewed, in material respects, and expired on December 31, 2011. 
Article 6 of the CBA provides for three shifts for police officers (7:00 am -  3:00 pm, 3:00 
pm -  11:00 pm, and 11:00 pm -7 :00 am) and the detective (10:00 am -  6:00 pm). 
Pursuant to Article 6, the police officers are assigned to their shifts for rotating tours of 
four days on and two days off, “unless 24-hour prior notice is given on shift change.” In 
regard to such shift changes, Article 6 further provides: “Any such change in shift will 
only occur due to a shortage in personnel due to absence or special events requiring a 
concentration of personnel during a shift.”
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In an April 11,2007 arbitration award, an arbitrator had occasion to construe 
Article 6 of the CBA. There, the arbitrator held that Article 6 granted the Town the right 
to involuntarily change an officer’s shift under the prescribed conditions. However, the 
arbitrator held that the CBA was breached when Police Chief Carl Schupp directed a 
police officer to work a different shift in order to have him attend a training program 
because the conditions permitting such an involuntary change were absent.
Starting in July, 2008, Schupp began to deny requests for voluntary shift and tour 
swaps. In response, the PBA filed the instant improper practice charge.
Two witnesses were called by the PBA to testify at the hearing, Ronald Moraski, 
a 14-year employee of the Town’s Police Department and the PBA’s Vice President, 
and Lisa LiVigni, a unit police officer from 1996 until she was promoted to a nonunit 
sergeant in 2009. As accurately described by the ALJ, their testimony shows that for at 
least 10 years the department permitted a practice by which police officers could swap 
shifts and tours upon notice to the scheduling sergeant or, in his or her absence, 
another sergeant or the chief of police if no sergeant were available. They testified that 
such swaps were for hours, days, months and, in one case, a year in duration. The 
practice ended in July 2008, when Police Chief Schupp denied requests to swap shifts 
by LiVigni and Moraski. According to Moraski, Schupp explained that if he could not 
direct involuntary shift changes pursuant to the 2007 arbitration award, then he would 
no longer permit voluntary swaps.
Although the Town’s answer to the charge alleges that the April 2007 arbitration 
award prohibits Schupp from allowing shift and tour swaps, Schupp testified that he did 
not recall the conversation with Moraski about why he would no longer permit voluntary
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shift and tour swaps. Nevertheless, consistent with Moraski’s and LiVigni’s testimony, 
Schupp testified the he knew of the practice of tour and shift swapping during his tenure 
as a police officer from 1981, sergeant from 1987 and chief of police from 1994. To his 
recollection, however, such swaps were “infrequent.” Indeed, according to Schupp, 
after he became chief of police, the requests were made to one of the sergeants, not 
him. Sometimes a sergeant would advise him of a swap adding that the sergeant 
assumed he would have no problem with it. Thus, to his recollection, swaps occurred 
perhaps five times during his tenure as a sergeant and another five times since he 
became Chief. However, he also testified that swaps occurred a few times each year. 
He recalled having personally approved some of them.
Schupp testified that swaps were often made between police officers and 
sergeants. He testified that he put a stop to such inter-ranks swaps because one of the 
sergeants was doing it too frequently and was sometimes reluctant to repay the police 
officer for the swap, causing tension among the ranks. After that, he permitted swaps 
only between employees of the same rank. He testified that other than that restriction, 
“there were no parameters set out” governing swaps.2 After denying the at-issue 
requests from police officers to swap shifts and tours, Schupp continued to permit 
sergeants to swap them.
Despite Schupp’s general knowledge of shift and tour swaps, he denied any 
recollection of specific swaps about which Moraski and LiVigni testified. Indeed, he 
denied any memory of a conversation memorialized in a letter from LiVigni to him about 
his denial of a specific swap that she requested to attend a funeral in July 2008.
2 Transcript, p. 71.
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DISCUSSION
A collective bargaining obligation attaches to a past practice concerning non­
contractual, mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of employment where the 
practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient 
under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit 
employees that the practice will continue.3 The reasonableness of the expectation 
among the affected employees that the practice will continue can be presumed from the 
practice’s duration, with consideration of the specific circumstances under which it has 
existed.4 Following the prima facie showing, an employer may present a defense 
demonstrating that it lacked either actual or constructive knowledge of the practice and, 
thus, that it had not acquiesced to it.5 However, constructive knowledge exists when 
the past practice is reasonably subject to the employer’s managerial and/or supervisory' 
responsibilities and obligations.6
Here, we find, as did the ALJ, that the record reveals a 10-year practice pursuant 
to which police officers were permitted to swap shifts and tours whenever they wished, 
upon notice to the scheduling sergeant or, in the absence of a scheduling sergeant,
3 Chenango Forks Cent School Dist, 40 PERB If 3012 (2007), confirmed sub nom. 
Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 AD3d 
1479, 45 PERB U 7006 (3d Dept 2012), affirmed 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB If 7008 (2013); 
Manhassett Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 3005 (2008), confirmed and mod in part 
sub nom. Manhassett UFSD v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 
42 PERB If 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remand 42 PERB If 3016 (2009); Fashion Inst of 
Tech, 41 PERB 3010 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Fashion Inst of Tech v New York 
State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 68 AD3d 605, 42 PERB 7011 (1st Dept 2009).
4 Id.
5 Id.
Id.6
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another sergeant or the chief of police. Although such swaps were permitted to be 
made with sergeants, the ALJ correctly held that the termination of those inter-rank 
swaps was not mandatorily negotiable.7 Conversely, shift and tour swaps that do not 
affect staffing requirements, such as those in issue here, are mandatorily negotiable.8
We further find that the practice was sufficiently continuous, uninterrupted and 
unequivocal to establish a reasonable expectation among the affected employees that 
the practice would continue. While Schupp’s characterization of the frequency of shift 
and tour swaps differs from Moraski’s and LiVigni’s, the record shows that whenever a 
swap was requested it was permitted until Schupp terminated the practice. Put another 
way, while the frequency of the.swaps is a relevant inquiry, the consistency of the 
practice is dispositive. In that regard, we find no fault with the ALJ’s finding that 
Schupp’s lack of recollection is less persuasive regarding the extent of the practice than 
Moraski’s and LiVigni’s recollection and description.9 Although they could not recount 
the dates of the swaps or the persons involved, their testimony as a whole indicates to 
us that the practice was so routine as to be of little note when it occurred.
The record also establishes that Schupp and his sergeants knew of the practice. 
Indeed, the testimony of all three witnesses shows that the swaps were undertaken on 
notice to the supervisory officers.
7 See, e.g., City of Oneida, 14 PERB 3095 (1981). Cf., Local 589, International
Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 16 PERB 3030 (1983).
9 See, e.g., Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 41 
PERB T| 3007 (1008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 41 PERB 7007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008), affd 67 AD3d 567, 42 
PERBU7008 (1st Dep't 2009).
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Accordingly, we find that the record sufficiently establishes all elements of a past 
practice that may not be unilaterally terminated. Because the Town unilaterally 
terminated the practice, it violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act, unless the balance of its 
exceptions have merit.
The Town’s exceptions allege that the parties’ CBA manifests the satisfaction of 
its duty to negotiate concerning shift and tour swaps or that the PBA waived its 
bargaining rights concerning the subject. However, while the Town alleged in its 
answer to the charge that PERB lacked jurisdiction over the dispute; it did not allege 
either affirmative defense of duty satisfaction or waiver. Therefore, the Town’s 
exceptions related to those defenses are not properly before us.10
Even if the Town’s affirmative defenses were properly before us, we would reject 
them. Article 6 of the parties’ CBA, upon which the Town chiefly relies, establishes 
fixed shifts and tours that could be changed by the Town only under specific 
circumstances in order to accommodate the Town’s staffing requirements. Article 6 
does not address voluntary shift and tour exchanges between employees of equal rank 
that do not affect the Town’s staffing needs on any particular tour or shift. Furthermore, 
Article 16 of the CBA -  the contractual management’s rights clause -  reserves to the
10 See, New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB 1} 3037 (1987), confirmed sub nom. New 
York City Transit Auth v New york State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 
PERB 7001 (2d Dept 1989); Clarkstown Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB 1J3047 (1991) 
(“Waiver is an affirmative defense which must be raised in the answer if the defense is 
to be properly considered.”); Shelter Island Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB U 3032 
(2012); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB 1j 3023 (2009); County of 
Greene and Sheriff of Greene County, 42 PERB 1J3031 (2009); New York City Trans 
Auth, 41 PERB H 3014 (2008) (the affirmative defense of duty satisfaction must be 
pleaded and proved).
Case No. U-28579 - 8 -
Town “all authority, rights and responsibilities” over its employees “under applicable 
laws and regulations . . . Among the applicable rights and responsibilities are those 
imposed on the Town under the Act, including the right and responsibility to negotiate 
with the PBA concerning police officers’ terms and conditions of employment, such as 
the right to swap shifts and tours. Thus, Article 16 does not reflect the PBA’s waiver of 
its bargaining rights concerning such swaps.
In finding that the Town’s exceptions are unavailing, we note that the Town takes 
no exception to the ALJ’s conclusion that PERB possesses jurisdiction over the dispute. 
While our jurisdiction is not determined by the parties’ arguments, we agree with the 
ALJ’s jurisdictional determination.
Accordingly, we deny the Town’s exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ 
that the Town violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally terminating the practice of 
permitting officers represented by the PBA to swap shifts and tours upon notice to the 
scheduling sergeant or, in his or her absence, another sergeant or the chief of police, 
and we adopt the ALJ’s recommended remedial order.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT the Town of Blooming Grove will:
1. Reinstate the past practice of allowing unit members to exchange, or swap, 
tours of duty, or portions of tours of duty, with one another, as it existed prior to 
July 2008;
2. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, resulting from 
the denial of intra-unit tour exchanges, plus interest at the maximum legal rate;
and
Case No. U-28579 -9 -
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations
normally used to post notices to PBA unit members.
DATED: May 27, 2014
Albany, New York
^  Jerome L^kowitz^fiairperson 
z 7" ' Sheila S. Cole, Member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
We hereby notify all employees of the Town of Blooming Grove (Town) in the unit 
represented by the Blooming Grove Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA), 
that the Town will:
1: Reinstate the past practice of allowing unit members to exchange, or swap, tours of 
duty, or portions of tours of duty, with one another, as it existed prior to July 2008; and
2. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, resulting from the 
denial of intra-unit tour exchanges, plus interest at the maximum legal rate.
Dated..................  B y ............................ ..................
On behalf of Town of Blooming Grove
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, CASE NO. C-6005
Petitioner,
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Employer.
LISA M. KING, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of counsel), for 
Petitioner
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, for 
Employer
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (“State”) to 
an interim decision of PERB’s Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (“Director”) in a representation proceeding initiated by the New York 
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (“PEF”).1 By its petition, PEF seeks to * 
add nearly 2,000 employees to its bargaining unit of approximately 56,000 professional, 
scientific and technical employees (the “PS&T” unit). In his interim decision, the 
Director determined that 256 of the at-issue employees were properly placed into PEF’s 
bargaining unit based upon the parties’ March 27, 2013 agreement that the titles share 
a community of interest with titles in PEF’s unit and that the employees do not perform
1 46 PERB Tl 4006 (2013).
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duties warranting their designation as managerial or confidential within the meaning of § 
201.7 (a) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (“Act” or “Taylor Law”). As 
consideration for the agreement, PEF withdrew 11 other pending representation 
petitions involving numerous other positions that PEF wished to add to its unit. There 
remain hundreds of positions at issue in the instant petition.
EXCEPTIONS
The State argues that the Director should have granted its post-decision request 
to be relieved of its agreement with PEF on which he based his interim decision. 
Alternatively, it asks us to release it from its stipulation with PEF and remand the matter 
to the Director to decide the merits of the representation issues under §§ 201.7 (a) and 
207.1 of the Act based on an evidentiary record. PEF argues that the State should not 
be released from its stipulation, emphasizing, among other things, that PEF has 
withdrawn several other representation petitions concerning other positions in 
consideration for the State’s agreement that the at-issue 256 employees should be 
placed into its unit.
BACKGROUND
Since September 27, 1978, when PEF first became the representative of the 
PS&T unit,2 the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations (“GOER”) and PEF have 
applied a process to expeditiously determine how newly created or reclassified titles 
would be treated for purposes of determining their representational status under the Act; 
that is, whether the positions should be treated as managerial or confidential or should
2 11 PERB H3077, H3078, (1978).
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be placed into PEF’s bargaining unit. Under that process, upon creation or 
reclassification of a position, the State makes a determination whether the position 
performs duties warranting its designation as managerial or confidential, and it notifies 
PEF of its determination. If PEF disagrees with the State’s determination that a position 
is managerial or confidential, it can file a petition with PERB to represent the position. 
That procedure was formally accepted by PERB in 1986.3
On August 25, 2010, PEF filed a petition to add approximately 2,000 employees 
to its bargaining unit of about 56,000 employees.4 Thereafter, PEF and GOER engaged 
in settlement negotiations concerning that petition and eleven others that were pending 
before PERB that PEF had previously filed. Ultimately, PEF agreed to withdraw its 
petitions in all cases other than the instant one, while GOER agreed that all employees 
claimed by PEF in that petition other than those working for the Department of 
Transportation would be accreted to the PS&T unit. Therefore, they submitted to the 
Director a stipulation dated March 27, 2013, reflecting their agreement that certain 
employees at issue in the instant petition share a community of interest with others in 
the PS&T Unit and that none performs duties that would render them managerial or 
confidential within the meaning of the Act. In consideration, PEF withdrew its petitions 
regarding certain other titles.
Accordingly, by interim decision dated March 27, 2013, the Director placed the 
agreed upon positions into PEF’s bargaining unit.
3 Joint Memorandum of Procedure concerning Negotiating Unit Designation, October 
17, 1986.
4 Case No. C-6005.
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By letter dated April 19, 2013, after receiving the Director’s interim decision, 
GOER requested that he retract it and consider PEF’s petition on its merits rather than 
on the parties’ agreement. It urged that the various State agencies where the 
employees work had not agreed to the placement of the titles into PEF’s bargaining 
unit.5
PEF responded by opposing GOER’s request. By letter dated May 9, 2013, the 
Director denied GOER’s request.6
5 At page 15 of its brief to us, GOER recited that it discovered:
through contacts from affected state agencies, that GOER 
had not provided the agencies whose employees are at 
issue in the Stipulation with sufficient guidance to properly 
analyze whether the employees who were the subject of the 
Stipulation were still performing in a managerial or 
confidential capacity. Indeed, GOER now has reason to 
believe that certain of the employees continue to perform 
duties that are appropriately deemed managerial or 
confidential under Civil Service Law §201.7(a), contrary to 
what the State agreed to in the Stipulation.
6 In his letter denying GOER’s request to be relieved of its stipulation, the Director
stated, in relevant part:
[T]he State argues that PERB’s decision in Public 
. Employees’ Federation, 45 PERB ^3005 (2012), is 
controlling here. That case is also unavailing to the State.
In that matter, the Board held that under circumstances not 
here relevant, a party may withdraw a request made 
pursuant to §304.1(d) of the Rules to withdraw an improper 
practice charge prior to the Director’s processing that 
withdrawal request. Simply put, it is neither analogous nor 
applicable to any issue raised here.
Moreover, apart from the above, the State’s motion is 
factually insufficient in that it is based solely in conclusory 
terms. It states that “certain of the employees who were the 
subject of the stipulation continue to perform duties that are
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GOER argues that PERB has it within its power to invalidate the stipulation in this 
matter and to void the Interim Decision on the ground that it was an inadvertent error for 
GOER’s attorney to have executed it.
PERB, as any adjudicative agency, may and should invalidate a settlement when
it is appropriate to do so, but only then. Indeed, in Hallock v State of New York, 64
NY2d 224 (1984), Judge Kaye wrote in the opening sentence (id., at p. 228);
A statement of settlement made by counsel in open court 
may bind his clients even where it exceeds his actual 
authority.
There, Hallock’s lawyer had represented Hallock through prior settlement negotiations,
which cloaked him with apparent, if not actual authority to finally settle the dispute.
Therefore, the Court rejected Hallock’s effort to be relieved of his obligations under the
settlement on the theory that his attorney lacked authority to bind him to its terms.
In reaching its conclusion in Hallock, the Court found it relevant, but not
dispositive, that the State established detrimental reliance on the settlement. According
to the Court (id., at p. 232):
The discontinuance of lengthy litigation on the day of 
trial, in reliance on the adversary's settlement 
stipulation -- even for defendants, who often may
appropriately deemed managerial or confidential...’’, but it 
does not identify those individuals. Their stipulation and my 
decision in reliance thereon, placed approximately 250 
individuals into PEF’s bargaining unit. The State’s claim that 
only certain employees, absent identification of those 
individuals, is simply too vague to support an invalidation of 
its entire stipulation as to approximately 250 employees.
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prefer that judgment be deferred -- coupled with 
plaintiffs' silence for more than two months 
thereafter, is itself a change of position, if such a 
showing is indeed even required before the doctrine 
of apparent authority may be invoked. [Footnote 
omitted.] We need not inquire whether there was 
any actual loss of witnesses or evidence, for we 
recognize that, after five years, halting the machinery 
of litigation when a trial scheduled to begin that day 
is marked off the calendar constitutes detriment.
Additionally, in the words of the dissenting Justice at 
the Appellate Division, to set aside this settlement 
stipulation “invites destruction of the process of open- 
court settlements, for every such settlement would be 
liable to subsequent rescission by the simple 
expedient of a litigant's self-serving assertion, joined 
in by his attorney and previously uncommunicated to 
either the court or others involved in the settlement, 
that the litigant had limited his attorney's authority”
(98 AD2d 856, 858-859).
Here, as in Hallock, the parties have a well-established history of negotiating 
binding settlements regarding representation questions identical to those at issue before 
the Director, at a minimum, cloaking GOER with apparent authority to bind the State to 
the terms of the instant settlement.7 Indeed, as a matter of law, GOER has actual 
authority to negotiate such settlements.
Article 24 of the Executive Law created GOER as an executive agency of the
State and, in § 650, it provides that GOER shall:
act as the governor's agent in conducting collective 
negotiations, to assure the proper implementation and 
administration of agreements reached pursuant to such 
negotiations, and to assist the governor and direct and 
coordinate the state's efforts with regard to the state's 
powers and duties under the public employees' fair 
employment act.
7 State of New York, 30 PERB 4018 (1997); 35 PERB 4016 (2002); 38 PERB 1j 4022 
(2005); 39 PERB U 4007 (2006); 39 PERB U 4016 (2006); 40 PERB 4015 (2007).
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Executive Law § 653 provides that GOER “shall assist the governor with regard to
relations between the state and its employees." Examples of such assistance are:
acting as the governor's agent in discharging the 
powers and duties conferred on the governor by the 
public employees' fair employment act, [footnote 
omitted] as amended, including, without limitation, 
conducting collective negotiations with recognized or 
certified employee organizations and executing 
agreements reached pursuant thereto.
Therefore, GOER does not act as agent for each of the State’s many agencies and 
departments, and their authorization to negotiate agreements with PEF under the Taylor 
Law is not required to enable GOER to bind the State to stipulations, including those 
that concern the representation status of State employees.
)  Furthermore, Executive Law §654 provides that other State “officers,
departments boards, commissioners or agencies” can be required to cooperate with 
GOER in implementing arid administering agreements that GOER has reached with 
State employee organizations, and not the other way around. If GOER wishes to 
condition its negotiations on the approval of each of the affected State agencies, that 
limitation on its authority must be clearly communicated during the negotiations, even 
assuming such conditions are enforceable over objection of the at-issue recognized or 
certified employee organization. Here, as in Hallock, there is no indication that PEF 
was aware of, much less that it acquiesced in, any such limitation on GOER’S authority 
to agree to the at-issue unit placement.
Moreover, as in Hallock, PEF has acted with detrimental reliance on the 
) settlement by withdrawing 11 other petitions concerning many other employees in
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consideration for the State’s agreement that the at-issue employees are appropriately 
included in PEF’s bargaining unit. Likewise, as a result of the agreement, the parties 
are relieved of a great deal of litigation regarding the merits of the placement of each 
employee into PEF’s unit.
Accordingly, on the facts of this case, we reject GOER’s argument that it should 
be permitted to withdraw from its agreement with PEF.
NOW, THEREFORE, the State’s exceptions are denied and PEF’s petition in 
Case No. C-6005 is granted to the extent of the parties’ March 27, 2013 stipulation, and 
the matter is remanded to the Director for further proceedings, as appropriate, to 
resolve the representation questions presented by PEF’s petition concerning those 
positions not addressed herein.
DATED: May 27, 2014
Albany, New York
Jerome LejK6witz,J^f£irperson
Sheila S. Cofe, Member
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INTERIM BOARD DECISION
This matter comes to us on interlocutory exceptions filed by the Dormitory 
Authority of the State of New York (“DASNY”) to a March 5, 2014 letter ruling made by 
the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation, in the 
absence of the assigned Administrative Law Judge, concerning the processing of a unit 
clarification/placement petition filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSME, AFL-CIO (“CSEA”). The Assistant Director ruled, over DASNY’s 
objection, that CSEA’s petition seeking to add certain titles to its unit should be 
processed notwithstanding that the at-issue titles had been previously designated by the 
Board as managerial or confidential pursuant to § 201.7 (a) of the Public Employees’ 
Fair Employment Act.1 Further processing of CSEA’s petition has been put on hold by 
the Assistant Director, pending disposition of DASNY’s exceptions.
1 DASNY, 336 PERB 4004 (2003), 33 PERB 4000.11 (200), 18 PERB M 4000.20 
(1985) (certain employees designated on consent); DASNY, 38 PERB U 4015, afd in
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EXCEPTIONS
Relying on the prior designations of the at-issue employees,* 2 DASNY argues that 
the instant petition should not have been processed because it is barred by both 
collateral estoppel and res judicata.
CSEA opposes the exceptions on two grounds. First, it argues that the 
exceptions are procedurally defective because they were not preceded by a notice of 
motion and motion for permission to file them. Second, it argues that the prior 
designations on which DASNY relies were granted on consent or on the basis of 
analyses that have been subsequently reversed by the Board.3 Therefore, CSEA 
concludes that the prior designations are not controlling.
DISCUSSION
part and revsd in part U 3029 (2005), confd sub nom. CSEA v PERB, 34 AD3d 884, 39 
PERB H 7011 (3d Dept 2006) (certain employees designated on the merits of a record).
2 Id.
3 See, Fashion Inst of Tech, 42 PERB H 3018 at 3061-3062 (2009), where we held:
[l]n Dormitory Authority of the State of New York [38 PERB U 3029 
(2005)], the Board announced a “different template with which to evaluate 
the managerial status of a title” [id., at p 3097] premised on an employer's 
adoption of a less hierarchical structure which grants greater employee 
participation in decision-making. While we agree that organizational 
structure is relevant to determining whether a person is managerial 
pursuant to § 201.7(a)(i) of the Act, we overrule Dormitory Authority to the 
extent it adopted a new standard rendering hierarchical compression or an 
employer's adoption of other alternative forms of work organization as a 
determinative or primary factor. An organizational structure or culture that 
encourages employee input into the creation and modification of employer 
policies or the means of operation does not necessarily metamorphosize 
an employee into a person that should be designated managerial under § 
201.7(a) of the Act. Granting managerial designations primarily based 
upon such a structure or culture would be at variance with City of 
Binghamton [12 PERB U 3099 (1979)] and has the potential to disrupt 
existing negotiation units through organizational reassessments and 
restructuring, a result we find inconsistent with the Legislature's intent in 
enacting the 1971 amendment to § 201.7(a).
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Because we deny the interlocutory exceptions, we do not treat with CSEA’s 
procedural objection.
Both parties have legitimate arguments regarding the merits of CSEA’s petition. 
However, none is so convincing as to warrant its summary dismissal or grant.
Therefore, we find it most appropriate to have the parties address their arguments to the 
assigned ALJ. We will consider the merits of the petition on timely exceptions to the 
ALJ’s final decision.
Accordingly, DASNY’s interlocutory exceptions are hereby denied, and the 
matter is remanded to the assigned ALJ for further processing.
DATED: May 27, 2014
Albany, New York
Sheila S. CoK Member
